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Abstract
The article analyzes the development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the context of the
revenge policy of Russia against Ukraine at the turn of the 21st century. It is discovered that
almost a quarter of a century of inactivity of the Ukrainian authorities and active anti-Ukrainian
and anti-state actions of the Russian Orthodox Church and its Little-Russian branch the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate contributed to their introduction into
the Ukrainian humanitarian space of fundamental ideas, dogmas, and postulates of the “Russian
World,” which subsequently led to the occupation by Russia of Crimea and parts of Donbas
and the so-called “Russian Spring” in 2014. It is shown that Russia’s armed and information
aggression in early 2014 called into question the very existence of the Ukrainian state and the
Ukrainian nation, but thanks to the all-Ukrainian patriotic movement, including the stated
policy and position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the enemy was
stopped. It is proved that the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare led not only to
temporary territorial losses, huge casualties, tragedies, etc., but also to the unification of
Ukrainians, the creation of the Ukrainian political nation, and a significant consolidation of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. Russian aggression became a catalyst for
the unity of pro-Ukrainian forces and contributed to the intensification of the process of
creating the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Research on religious identification of
representatives of the Ukrainian community has been carried out using the methods of
individual questionnaire survey and included observation; the influence of the destructive

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2022) XLII, 4

27

Russian factor on their religious self-identification has been traced. It is found that in the
context of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Armed Forces, which began on
February 24, 2022, Ukrainians united in the name of victory over the aggressor, so the patriotic
believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will have to make a
final choice about whether or not to join the Orthodox Church of Ukraine not only to weaken
the pro-Russian fifth column in Ukraine but to help resistance forces in liberating the
temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories.
Keywords: Ukraine, Ukrainians, Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
Kyiv Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, Orthodox Church
of Ukraine, Russian Federation, Russian Orthodox Church, “Russian World.”
Introduction
In the context of the revanchist neo-imperial policy of the Russian Federation
(hereinafter – RF) towards Ukraine and the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare,
which has been going on for nine years, especially after February 24, 2022, when the full-scale
invasion of the Russian Armed Forces from the north, east, and south of Ukraine began, the
question arises about the very existence of Ukrainian statehood and the survival of Ukrainians
as a unique ethnic community and political nation. Despite thousands killed, tens of thousands
wounded and crippled physically and spiritually, and millions forcibly displaced, Ukraine and
Ukrainians continue to deter Russian military, informational, spiritual, economic, diplomatic,
and cultural aggression. One of the cornerstones of the existence of the Ukrainian independent
unified state is the highly spiritual foundation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which originated on the
banks of the Dnieper in the Golden-Domed Kyiv in the second half of the 9th century and since
ancient times, in spite of all its ups and downs, has served Ukraine and Ukrainians by faith and
truth.
In our investigation of the state of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, we try to objectively and
thoughtfully analyze the important role of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in domestic
ethnocultural, state-building, and nation-building processes, especially in the conditions of the
undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare; to comprehend the essence of modern Russian
imperialism; to reveal the destructive activities in Ukraine of the Russian Orthodox Church
(hereinafter–ROC) and its satellite–the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate (hereinafter–UOC-MP); to characterize the criminal essence of the “Russian
World”; to show the patriotic activity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv
Patriarchate (hereinafter–UOC-KP) and its significant role in the formation of the Orthodox
Church of Ukraine (hereinafter–OCU).
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The scientific novelty of the article consists in the development of current issues, which,
despite a large number of publications on this topic, are still insufficiently studied and therefore
require further unbiased studies.
The objective of the study is to analyze the development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the
context of Russia’s revenge policy against Ukraine at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. To
achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following research tasks: to briefly analyze the
level of scientific development of the topic; to show the active work of the UOC-KP in uniting
Ukrainians in the conditions of the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare and the
creation of the UOC; to reveal the place of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the consolidation of
Ukrainians at the turn of the millennium.
Historiography of the Problem
The study of the critical role of the UOC-KP in the restoration, development, and
protection of the Ukrainian state is becoming an important object of scientific research. Some
aspects of this topical issue were analyzed by the following researchers: Yu. Boreiko, 1
O. Yeriemieiev, 2 S. Zdioruk, 3 S. Kahamlyk, 4 A. Kolodnyi, 5 V. Klos, 6 V. Krysachenko, 7

Ю. Борейко, Православна ідентичність у сучасному українському суспільстві Православ’я в Україні:
Збірник матеріалів VІ Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2016), c. 831–837. [Orthodox identity in
modern Ukrainian society (Kyiv, 2016), pp. 831–837]
2
О.С. Єрємєєв, Проблеми та перспективи становлення Української Помісної Православної Церкви на
сучасному етапі розвитку українського суспільства Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів V
Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ 2015, Ч. 1.), с. 215-225. [Problems and prospects of formation of
the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church at the present stage of development of Ukrainian society. Orthodoxy in
Ukraine: Proceedings of the V International Scientific Conference (Kyiv, 2015, Part 1.) p. 215-225.]
3
С. Здіорук, Національна Церква та національна релігія як форми духовного самовираження етносу.
Релігія і нація в суспільному житті України й світу. (Київ: Наукова думка, 2006), с. 73-86. [National
Church and national religion as forms of spiritual self-expression of the ethnos. Religion and nation in the
public life of Ukraine and the world (Kyiv: scientific thought, 2006), pp. 73-86.]; В. М. Яблонський; С. І.
Здіорук; В. В. Токман; В. В. Астаф’єф; О. Л.Валевський; С. О. Зубченко; А. Ю. Іщенко; О. М.
Литвиненко, Україна та проект «Русского Мира». Аналітична доповідь. (Київ, 2014), 95 с. [Ukraine and
the project "Russian World". Analytical report. (Kyiv, 2014), 95 p]
4
С. Кагамлик, Divide et impera. Російський централізм як конфліктизаційний чинник для українського
православ’я в ретроспективі та сучасних реаліях. Українознавчий альманах.( К.: «Міленіум», 2019,
Випуск 25). С. 77–83. [Divide et impera. Russian centralism as a factor of conflict for Ukrainian Orthodoxy in
retrospect and modern realities. Ukrainian Studies Almanac. (Kyiv: Millennium, 2019, Issue 25.), pp. 77-83]
5
А.Колодний, С. Здіорук, Становлення національних церков як складової національного відродження
Релігійна свобода: історичне підґрунтя, правові основи і реалії сьогодення. (Київ, 1998), с. 43–49.
[Formation of national churches as part of the national revival. Religious freedom: historical background, legal
framework and realities of today. (Kyiv, 1998), pp. 43–49.]
6
В. Клос, Протоієрей. Автокефалія Української Церкви: огляд від Хрещення до Синодального Томосу.
(Київ, 2019), 190 с. [Archpriest. Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church: an overview from Baptism to the
Synodal Thomas. (K, 2019), 190 p.]
7
В. Крисаченко, Світоглядна парадигма ХХ ст.: український внесок. Українознавство. (2008, № 1), с.
76–82. [Worldview paradigm of the twentieth century: the Ukrainian contribution. Ukrainian Studies. (2008, №
1), pp. 76–82.]
1
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P. Pavlenko, 8 M. Piren, 9 Ya. Potapenko, 10 I. Prelovska, 11 O. Sahan,

12

O. Chyrkov, 13

O. Shuba,14 and others. At the same time, the stated problem is still insufficiently studied and
therefore needs further investigation.
Russia’s Confrontation with Ukraine: The Destructive Role of the “Russian World”
The Russian state has existed in the format of an empire for three centuries. First, it was
a feudal-capitalist, then a totalitarian-Soviet, and now an autocratic empire. During this time,
Ukraine and Ukrainians were an important part of these imperial state formations. Even more,
the military union of the Ukrainian Cossack-Hetman State under B. Khmelnytsky with the
Moscow Empire, Muscovy under the leadership of Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich weakened the
Commonwealth and later became an empire under Emperor Pyotr Alekseyevich.
It seemed that with the destruction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(hereinafter – the USSR), Russia would finally get rid of its imperial past and begin to develop
as a democratic and legal state. But since Russia is de jure and de facto a multinational entity

П. Ю. Павленко, Українська Православна Церква Московського Патріархату – епіцентр російського
неоімперіалізму в Україні (погляд через призму війни на Донбасі). Православ’я в Україні: Збірник
матеріалів V Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2015, Ч. 1.), с. 162–171. [Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate - the epicenter of Russian neo-imperialism in Ukraine (view through the
prism of the war in Donbass). Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the V International Scientific Conference.
(Kyiv, 2015, Part 1), pp. 162–171]
9
М. І. Пірен, Роль духовних цінностей у формуванні громадянської позиції особистості в сучасному
проблемному українському суспільстві. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів V Міжнародної
наукової конференції. (Київ, 2015, Ч. 1), с. 172–180. [The role of spiritual values in the formation of civic
position of the individual in modern problematic Ukrainian society. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the V
International Scientific Conference (Kyiv, 2015, Part 1), pp. 172– 80]
10
Я. Потапенко, П’ята російсько-українська війна: від майдану до східного фронту (підходи, оцінки,
інтерпретації). (Переяслав-Хмельницький: Видавництво К С В, 2016), 304 с. [The fifth Russian-Ukrainian
war: from the Maidan to the Eastern Front (approaches, assessments, interpretations). (PereyaslavKhmelnytsky: KS Publishing House, 2016), 304 p]
11
І. Преловська, Помісний Собор Української Православної Церкви 1-3 листопада 1991 року:
передумови і наслідки. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів VІ Міжнародної наукової конференції.
(Київ, 2016), с. 429–439. [Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church November 1-3, 1991:
preconditions and consequences. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the VI International Scientific
Conference. (Kyiv, 2016), pp. 429–439.]
12
О.Н. Саган, Національні прояви православ’я: український аспект. (Київ: Світ Знань, 2001), 256 с.
[National manifestations of Orthodoxy: the Ukrainian aspect. (Kyiv: World of Knowledge, 2001), 256 p.]; О.
Н. Саган, Суспільний запит на Помісну Церкву: проблеми, перспективи реалізації. Православ’я в
Україні: Збірник матеріалів V Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2015, Ч. 1), с. 181–189. [Public
demand for the Local Church: problems, prospects for implementation. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of
the V International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2015, Part 1), pp. 181-189]
13
О. Чирков, Зміни релігійної ситуації у світлі тенденцій етнокультурного розвитку України (19852019). Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ Міжнародної наукової конференції.– К., 2019. – С.
574–583. [Changes in the religious situation in the light of trends in ethnocultural development of Ukraine
(1985-2019). Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the IX International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2019),
pp. 574–583]
14
О. В. Шуба, Релігія в етнонаціональному розвитку України (політологічний аналіз). (Київ,1999), 222
с. [Religion in the ethno-national development of Ukraine (political science analysis) (Kyiv, 1999), 222 p]
8
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with many large and small ethnic groups who would like to eventually get rid of the power of
the metropolis, like, for example, the Chechens, Russia can only exist as an empire. Moreover,
the Kremlin not only seeks to maintain its imperial status (two Chechen wars confirm this) but
also to expand its territory, striving with all its might to return to the borders of the USSR in
1991. These aggressive intentions are realized by Moscow as a military effort (the RussianGeorgian war of 2008 and the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare, which began in
2014 and continues to this day) and with the help of the so-called “soft power”–the revanchistimperial geopolitical doctrine of the “Russian World.”
In essence, the “Russian World” as a political and ideological concept is not an ordinary
cultural project but a neo-imperial geopolitical ideological doctrine, which aims to theoretically
substantiate and practically reincarnate RF as a superpower within the borders of the Russian
Empire of 1914.15
According to S. Kahamlyk, modern Russian information aggression has infiltrated
Ukrainian society, one of which was the project of the “Russian World,” interpreted by Russian
neo-imperial ideologues as a special form of church unity.16 In this regard, Ya. Potapenko
emphasized that in the context of this great geopolitical strategy, an important component being
the concept of the “Russian World” as an “Orthodox civilization” that never really existed, the
activity of the UOC-MP as a local branch of the ROC is partly reduced to instrumental and
functional propaganda of anti-state and anti-Ukrainian ideas. It is a powerful resource of the
Kremlin neo-imperialism and marginalization of all Ukrainians. Thus, the implementation of
slogans of the “Russian World” intensified the practice of Russification of Ukraine during
Yanukovych’s presidency, and today inhibits the processes of forming modern Ukrainian
identity, and undermines trust in liberal democracy and Western civilization values.17
The Criminal Role of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the
Revanchist Policy of the Russian Federation against Ukraine
The Ukrainian National Revolution of the early 21st century muddled up all Putin’s
plans, and he decided to finally close the so-called “Ukrainian question” by annexing Crimea
and launching hostilities in eastern Ukraine.

Ю. Фігурний, «Русский мир» – важливий чинник агресії Російської Федерації супроти України й
українців. Українознавство. (2016, № 3 (60)), с. 41. ["Russian World" is an important factor in the aggression
of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Ukrainians. Ukrainian Studies. (2016, № 3 (60)), p. 41.]
16
Кагамлик, Divide et impera. p. 81.
17
Потапенко. П’ята російсько-українська війнаp, p. 294.
15
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According to P. Pavlenko, the annexation of Crimea, the formation of the so-called
“DPR” (Donetsk People’s Republic) and “LPR” (Luhansk People’s Republic) are not only the
products of the Kremlin propaganda of 2014. Russia had been preparing for their
implementation for at least 10 years and quite thoroughly. At least since 2004–2005, there has
been lively attention of the Russian media, including periodicals of the ROC and UOC-MP to
Ukraine; in particular, they discuss thoughts about creating some “Novorossiya” and even
“Donetsk People’s Republic;” the possibility of a civil war in Ukraine, on the one hand, and
on the other–a war between Russia and Ukraine.18
In the end, these imperial plans came to fruition during the undeclared RussianUkrainian hybrid warfare, O. Yeriemieiev notes. UOC-MP has never acknowledged Russian
aggression as a military invasion of a foreign state. The acknowledgment or support by certain
clergymen of the Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression in Donbas, both in the occupied
territories and in other parts of Ukraine are not isolated incidents. Its representatives refused to
honor the memory of Ukrainian soldiers killed in the east in the Verkhovna Rada in May 2015,
and Bishop Banchenskyi Lonhin (Zhar), a vicar of Chernivtsi Diocese (until 2014 led by
Metropolitan Onufrii), openly called the parishioners to sabotage mobilization in the face of
Russian aggression, declaring the then leadership of Ukraine enemies of Orthodoxy and
accusing Western countries of hostilities in Ukraine.19
The head of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Onufrii, directed and coordinated all this antiUkrainian policy. Thus, in the summer of 2015, in one of his interviews, he emphasized that
he considered the conflict in Donbas a “civil war,” and the events after the Revolution of
Dignity reminded him of the civil war that followed the overthrow of the monarchy in Russia
in 1917. At the same time, the head of the UOC-MP never mentioned Russian aggression
against Ukraine, the occupation of Crimea and parts of Donbas by Russian troops as the cause
of the conflict. As Metropolitan of the UOC-KP Yevstratii (Zoria) notes, from other interviews
and statements, it is known that Metropolitan Onufrii believes that Ukrainians and Russians
are “in fact one people” and Ukraine is part of the “Russian World.” From this thesis logically
follows his view that independent Ukraine is not a state of the Ukrainian people but the fruit of
the activities of “separatists” who broke away from the great-Russian integrity of the “SouthWestern region.” Therefore, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, according to the head of the
UOC-MP, is not an aggression but “the fight against separatists.” And if you look more

18
19

Павленко, Українська Православна Церква Московського, p. 163.
Єрємєєв. Проблеми та перспективи становлення, pp. 218-220.
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globally, it is in general the “protection of the Russian World from Western aggression” (USA
and Europe). Thus, in the worldview that seems to be in the mind of Metropolitan Onufrii,
Ukraine, as a completely independent state, is a product of the “Austrian Headquarters,” the
“Washington Regional Committee,” and the “godless West,” created to fight the “Russian
World” and “to enslave Russia.” Accordingly, unity with Russia is a cherished dream. After
analyzing these statements of the head of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Yevstratii draws the
following conclusions: “…the metropolitan once again testified to the truth of his description
made by Patriarch Filaret a year ago: ‘He is not a patriot of Ukraine.’” Now we can add: he is
a collaborator of the “Russian World.”20
Leaders of the UOC-MP speak pharisaically about their own patriotism, struggle for
peace in Ukraine, call for an end to the war, but in fact, their real actions significantly increase
the influence of the Kremlin’s revenge policy regarding religious conflicts in modern Ukraine
and contribute to the defeat and disintegration of the Ukrainian state. That is why P. Pavlenko
rightly notes that the UOC-MP in the person of Metropolitan Onufrii firstly, condemns only
the war waged by Ukraine, defending its territory from Russian aggression, and secondly,
advocates such a “peace” that would be beneficial for the RF. For it, the “just” and “sacred” is
exclusively the war that Putin launched against Ukraine together with his ideological ally
Patriarch Kirill. Thus, the scholar is convinced that the Ukrainian vector of the UOC-MP is out
of line as it supports pro-Russian forces in Ukraine, thus helping to promote and implement
Russia’s political interests in Ukraine.21
Thus, the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare was a great ordeal for the
Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but the citizens of Ukraine realize who is who. Leaders of the UOC-MP
avoided mentioning Russia as an aggressor, but on the contrary, constantly emphasized in the
speeches to their parishioners and in speeches in the media that this was not an interstate
conflict but a civil confrontation, a fratricidal war where “brother attacks the brother,” “Donbas
must be heard,” and so on.
The Contribution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to
Ukrainian State-Building and Nation-Building
In contrast, from the first days of the armed confrontation, the leadership, clergy, and
believers of the UOC-KP showed their civil position and defended the Ukrainian state. The
Архієпископ Євстратій (Зоря) Колаборант "русского мира". [Archbishop Eustratius (Zorya)
Collaborator of the "Russian world"] http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/yevstratij/55a8de30a8c6d
21
Павленко, Українська Православна Церква Московського p. 171.
20
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most active took up arms, and many UOC-KP priests supported the volunteer movement and
went to the front as chaplains. Eventually, the enemy was stopped, and the active phase of the
Russian-Ukrainian confrontation passed into a passive one. While the UOC-MP supported
Russia’s military and information aggression against Ukraine and Ukrainians, the UOC-KP
mobilized all its forces to oppose the Russian aggressor and their puppets and helped stop the
enemy offensive, end the so-called “Russian Spring,” and curtail the “Novorossiya” project.
The undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare once again demonstrated to
Ukrainians the importance of the religious factor in general and the importance of the existence
in Ukraine of its own autocephalous Orthodox Church, which will be Ukrainian not in words,
plaques, and official documents but primarily in its own actions, with a Ukrainian-centric
essence and a willingness to act in the interests of the Ukrainian people.
Realizing the prime importance of the religious question, Russian secular and
ecclesiastical leaders have long tried to deprive Ukrainians of their own Orthodox Church and
convert them to the ROC. It was in 1686 that the Kyiv Metropolitanate was illegally
subordinated to the ROC. That is why the ROC purposefully and persistently tried to
completely destroy the Ukrainian-centric spirit in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy and to fully subdue
it to Moscow and assimilate it.
However, with the rise of the Ukrainian state competition in the turbulent 20th century,
Ukrainian Orthodoxy was also revived. Eventually, with the collapse of the USSR and the
beginning of the building of the Ukrainian Independent Unified State, the renaissance of
Ukrainian Orthodoxy began. In our opinion, the establishment of the UOC-KP in 1992 was an
extremely important factor in the liberation of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy from the spiritual yoke
of the ROC and the “Russian World.”
The UOC-KP purposefully and systematically consolidated Ukrainians around the idea
of creating an OCU (Orthodox Church of Ukraine). In the end, they received their first success.
On October 11, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople
decided to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. According to this final document,
the Synodal Letter of 1686 on the temporary transfer to the ROC of the right to appoint Kyiv
metropolitans was revoked. The most important thing is that from then on, the Ecumenical
Patriarch of Constantinople declared his right and canonical territory of Ukraine, thus finally
removing it from the jurisdiction of the ROC. According to this decision, the ROC not only
finally loses Ukraine with its revenues and profits but also is being transformed from a leading
Orthodox church organization into an ordinary one, and in the conditions of the undeclared
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Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare, it is of great importance for Ukrainians, their consolidation,
and final victory over the aggressor.22
Creation and Development of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine
On December 15, 2018, the Unification Council of Bishops of the UOC-KP, the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (hereinafter – the UAOC), and the UOC-MP took
place in Kyiv, where Metropolitan Epiphanius was elected Primate of the OCU. The newly
elected head received Tomos on January 6, 2019, from Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew,
and thus Ukraine finally regained its own sovereign autocephalous Ukrainian Church. It is
significant that the Ecumenical Patriarch recognized as canonical all Orthodox church
organizations in Ukraine - UOC-KP, UAOC, UOC-MP, thus assisting them in equal dialogue
and consolidation, which ultimately contributed to the creation and development of the
OCU23.
Metropolitan Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine praised the role of Patriarch
Bartholomew, noting that this was a courageous step of the Ecumenical Patriarch, who
contributed to the creation of the OCU and helped to “carry out his saving ministry among the
Ukrainian people as an integral part of the United, Holy, Conciliar, and Apostolic Church.”24
The self-sufficient Ukrainian state must have its own autocephalous church,
which will be an effective factor in the formation of a highly spiritual Christian Ukraine and
the Ukrainian ethnocultural space. In this regard, O. Chyrkov emphasizes that for modern
Ukrainian society, the main ethnocultural consequences of changes in the religious situation
are as follows: 1) Ukrainian national religious organizations appeared, which include the
majority of believers in Ukraine; 2) the Ukrainian language began a full-fledged function in
the religious life; 3) the rites and traditions related to religious life, which were banned in the
USSR or forgotten due to adverse socio-political circumstances, revived; 4) the OCU, formed
on the basis of the UOC- KP, gained the highest canonical status in Ukraine; 5) the part
of Ukrainian believers’
Ю. Фігурний, Розвиток Українського Православ’я на зламі тисячоліть: етнокультурні, державотворчі
та націєтворчі аспекти. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ Міжнародної наукової конференції.
(Київ, 2019). с. 571-572. [Development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy at the turn of the millennium: ethnocultural,
state-building and nation-building aspects. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the IX International Scientific
Conference. (Kyiv, 2019), pp. 571-572.]
23
Ibid., p. 572
24
Промова Блаженнішого Митрополита Київського і Всієї України Епіфанія на церемонії вручення
шанованої нагороди Athenagoras Human Right Award. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ
Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2019), с.11-12. [Speech of His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and
All Ukraine Epiphany at the Athenagoras Human Right Award ceremony. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings
of the IX International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2019), p.11-12]
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communities that consider themselves belonging to the UOC-MP has decreased several
times.25
With the acquisition of the autocephalous statute, the UOC must purposefully unite
Ukrainians. On this thorny path, it will be actively opposed by the UOC-MP, which remains a
puppet in the hands of church hierarchs of the ROC and is, in essence, an agent of Russian
influence in Ukraine. Understanding this, the Ukrainian government should have helped the
OCU overcome Moscow’s religious expansion, but for some reason, the 2019 government
decree renaming the UOC-MP to the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine is not being
implemented, and the newly elected establishment has resigned. However, some positive trends
are already visible. Thus, at the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the restoration of the
Ukrainian state in the summer of 2021, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew had a meeting with
President of Ukraine V. Zelensky, during which they agreed on active cooperation aimed at
further development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
The OCU should become the center of the unification of all pro-Ukrainian forces and
purposefully continue to build the state and Ukraine-centric Church. In this regard, S.
Kahamlyk notes that the historic act of granting the UOC by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Tomos on autocephaly in early 2019 marked the end of the colonial state of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church and the beginning of a new, independent period in its history. Nevertheless,
the unification process will not be easy: active transitions of religious communities to the newly
formed OCU, and sharp opposition to the ROC, which does not want to lose its sphere of
influence on Ukraine and therefore does not recognize the fact of Tomos autocephaly, as well
as its Ukrainian branch of UOC-MP.26
According to Archpriest V. Klos, it is thanks to all the fighters for freedom and
independence that today we have the Ukrainian state and the OCU. It is only surprising that
many of those who call themselves Ukrainians and even patriots of their land still hold on to
the alien UOC-MP, which only calls itself Ukrainian but never was because it served and
continues to follow instructions from the Kremlin.27

О. Чирков, Зміни релігійної ситуації у світлі тенденцій етнокультурного розвитку України (19852019). Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2019), с.
582. [Changes in the religious situation in the light of trends in ethnocultural development of Ukraine (19852019). Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the IX International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2019), p. 582.]
26
Кагамлик, Divide et impera. p. 81.
27
В. Клос, Протоієрей. Автокефалія Української Церкви: огляд від Хрещення до Синодального Томосу.
(Київ, 2019), с. 182. [Archpriest. Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church: an overview from Baptism to the
Synodal Thomas. (K, 2019), p. 182]
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Another important task for the leadership of the OCU is its recognition at the
international level. In this regard, His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine
Epiphanius emphasizes: “I also have a dream. The dream of a day when all Local Churches,
without exception, will follow the canonical decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and
recognize our Local Orthodox Church of Ukraine as an equal Sister Church.”28
Ukrainian Orthodoxy: A Sociological Dimension
In order to identify priority factors of national and cultural identification of the
Ukrainian community and to clarify the impact of the destructive Russian factor on its national,
ethnic, linguistic, religious self-identification, one of the authors, O. Semenova, conducted a
study using questionnaire methods and included observation, which consists in immersing
oneself in the research environment and studying the situation “from within”, i.e., in real
conditions (2020). Two focus groups were formed to carry out the study: the first included
residents of Kostiantynivka, Donetsk region, which was seized by Donetsk People’s Republic
militants in April 2014, and in July of the same year during an anti-terrorist operation by the
National Guard of Ukraine and military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was released
from them; the second group included representatives of Zakarpattia, Kyiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr,
Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions of Ukraine. The sample included respondents of
different age, gender, professional, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics. The selection of
respondents was based on the “snowball” method when each respondent recommended a new
participant in the study. The survey was conducted on the basis of developed questionnaires;
previously, the respondents got acquainted with the Explanatory Note, which set out the main
provisions of the study: its issues and relevance, purpose, and methods of obtaining
information. The sample is unrepresentative, but the results of the survey are significant enough
to understand the influence of the Russian factor on individual members of the Ukrainian
religious community.29
The results of the survey showed that none of the respondents of the first focus group
considered the autonomous church an attribute of Ukrainian independence (33% answered
Промова Блаженнішого Митрополита Київського і Всієї України Епіфанія на церемонії вручення
шанованої нагороди Athenagoras Human Right Award. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ
Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2019), с.13. [Speech of His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All
Ukraine Epiphany at the Athenagoras Human Right Award ceremony. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of
the IX International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2019), p. 13]
29
О.Семенова, and M. Герасько. Національно-культурна ідентичність українського суспільства у
контексті сучасних гуманітарних викликів. Українознавство. (2020, № 2), с. 132-133. [ National and
cultural identity of Ukrainian society in the context of modern humanitarian challenges. Ukrainian Studies.
(2020, № 2), pp. 132-133].
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negatively; 56% could not answer; 11% refrained from answering), while 77% of the second
focus group provided a positive response, and 69% of them supported the provision of the
Tomos on the autocephaly of the OCU. It should be mentioned that the priority of religious
identity, among others, is determined by only one member of the first focus group (second
place out of eight; for other participants it ranks seventh or is not specified at all).30
The survey showed that the majority of respondents identify themselves with the
Orthodox tradition (91%); 9% did not indicate their affiliation to denominations. As the main
factors determining their religious identity, the respondents named religious values–82%,
religious behavior–14%, religious knowledge–9%. Other factors also included historical ties
and faith (4.5%), religious traditions of the region of residence (4.5%).31
Undoubtedly, religion has a significant consolidating potential, uniting people of
different ethnicity, social status, education, and political preferences. Today, the Ukrainian
religious community is faced with the use of the religious factor by Russia in its policy against
Ukraine, which has a destructive impact on the humanitarian space of our state and poses a
threat to its national security. Using the levers of influence on the ROC and through it on the
UOC-MP, Kremlin propagandists cultivate the ideology of “fratricidal war” and “civil
conflict,” thus denying the fact of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. Ideologists of
the Moscow Patriarchate spread the idea of the existence of a single “truly canonical” church
in the Ukrainian Orthodoxy–the UOC-MP, rejecting any alternatives to the ROC and
monopolizing the religious space of Ukraine. Obtaining the Tomos by the OCU was an
important step in recognition of Ukrainian church independence by world religious
institutions.32
According to the personal observations of L. Otroshko, the number of parishioners grew
in the Ascension Church of Kozelets deanery of the OCU. Fewer and fewer Orthodox believers
trust the UOC-MP, in particular its fables about the “divisive” nature of the Ukrainian
autocephaly, which are still spread in Moscow’s churches. More and more believers are
positive about Tomos. After all, by the recognition of the OCU as one of the 15 autocephalous
Orthodox churches in the world, the Ecumenical Patriarchate put everything in place. At the
regional level, the Ukrainian church is developing as it should. The educational mission of the
Ukrainian church at the regional level plays a significant role in the ethnocultural development
of the Ukrainian people. After all, according to the main law of the state, the people must be
Ibid., p. 134.
Ibid., pp. 133-134.
32
Ibid., p. 134.
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able to pray in Ukrainian in Ukrainian churches and know that the Ukrainian church prays
primarily for Ukrainian church patriarchs, the Ukrainian army, and the people of Ukraine.
These testimonies are confirmed by all-Ukrainian opinion polls. In the summer of 2021,
the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (hereinafter – KIIS) conducted an all-Ukrainian
opinion poll, “Religious self-identification of the population and attitudes towards the main
churches of Ukraine: June 2021.” According to it, the vast majority of Ukrainians (73%)
continue to consider themselves Orthodox. Another 9% consider themselves Greek Catholics,
and 7% atheists. Among those who consider themselves Orthodox, the majority, 58% consider
themselves members of the OCU. This figure has increased compared to June 2020 from 48%
to 58%.33
In turn, 25% consider themselves members of the UOC-MP (against 21.5% in June
2020). Additionally, 12% of such respondents consider themselves simply Orthodox, without
specifying the Patriarchate (compared to 23% in June 2020). Among the three largest Churches
in Ukraine, most respondents have a positive attitude towards the OCU: 52% of Ukrainians
have a positive attitude to the OCU, 34% have a neutral attitude, and 9% have a negative
attitude. At the same time, compared to June 2020, there are more people who are positive–
the number increased from 42% in June 2020 to 52% in June 2021. At the same time, 24% of
the population have a positive attitude to the UOC-MP (in June 2020–23%), neutral–37% (in
June 2020–37%), and negative–35% (in June 2020–32%). Among the heads of the three largest
Churches in Ukraine, most respondents have a positive attitude to Epiphanius: 45% of
Ukrainians have a positive attitude to Epiphanius, 38% have a neutral attitude, and 6% have a
negative attitude. At the same time, compared to June 2020, there were more positive people–
the number increased from 34% in June 2020 to 45% in June 2021. At the same time, 20%
have a positive attitude towards Onufrii (19% in June 2020), neutral–39% (in June 2020–
36.5%), negative–29% (in June 2020–26%).34
The establishment of the OCU and the granting of Tomos by the Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew contributed to the progressive development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in general
and the OCU in particular. This statement is confirmed by the results of the all-Ukrainian
sociological survey of the KIIS.

Релігійна самоідентифікація населення і ставлення до основних церков України: червень 2021 року.
[Religious self-identification of the population and attitude to the main churches of Ukraine: June 2021]
http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1052.
34
Ibid.
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During the survey, respondents were also asked to compare the OCU and the UOC-MP
by eight different characteristics, both positive and negative. Respondents had to answer which
of these Churches best met a certain feature. More respondents compared the OCU with such
characteristics as flexibility in responding to changes in society (54% believe that the OCU is
more in line with this characteristic, compared to 14% who chose the UOC-MP), promoting
the unification of society (53% vs. 13%), proximity to ordinary people (50% vs. 13%),
assistance in the fight against COVID-19 (34% vs. 6%), independence from Ukrainian or
foreign politicians, oligarchs (33% vs. 13%). On the other hand, more respondents associated
the UOC-MP with such characteristics as dependence on foreign structures (35% vs. 24%,
which named the OCU), attempts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine (42.5% vs. 21%), and
corruption (38% vs. 8%).35
If the previous government in the person of P. Poroshenko helped in every possible way
the establishment of the OCU, V. Zelensky and his team somewhat distanced themselves from
this positive process. Despite this, the number of believers and supporters of the OCU is
steadily growing. This is primarily due to ordinary believers, the so-called “Orthodox.” It
should be noted that ordinary Ukrainian citizens are gradually realizing the importance on their
own, uncontrolled by ROC and the Kremlin national church for Ukraine and the Ukrainian
political nation.
At the same time, the results of the all-Ukrainian poll of the KIIS indicate a slight
(within the sociological error) increase in trust in the UOC-MP. It seemed that during the
undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare, which began in February 2014, the citizens of
Ukraine should have already understood who is a friend and who is a foe. However, the
powerful information war waged by Russia against Ukraine and the significant infusion of huge
financial resources of pro-Russian oligarchs to maintain the reputation of the UOC-MP brings
the Kremlin the desired dividends and significantly strengthens the pro-Russian lobby in the
Ukrainian state.
Also, one should mention the significant conservatism of the religious consciousness
of believers. For example, a student friend of one of the study’s authors, who lives in Zhytomyr,
is a parishioner of the UOC-MP and a teacher, when asked by Yu. Fihurnyi about his attitude
to the UOC and granting of autocephaly, responded that he treated its acquisition of the
autocephalous status positively, but was not going to become its parishioner. “You see,” said
the friend, “I met my future beloved wife in the UOC-MP cathedral, and she still works there.
35
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I am very used to the Church. If they adopt the unification decision at the highest level, I will
gladly accept it, but for now, let everything remain the same.”
The Full-Scale Invasion of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine
However, on February 24, 2022, a different reality came to Ukraine and Ukrainians.
The war knocked on the door of every family. Many things from the old life became
unimportant. Only one goal became paramount–the elimination of the Russian occupiers and
the liberation of all Ukrainian lands.
The ROC supports the so-called “special military operation in Ukraine.” The leadership
of the UOC-MP is trying to distance itself from the aggressive and criminal actions of its
patrons but is doing it quite unconvincingly.
On March 8-9, 2022, the Rating Sociological Group conducted a survey of the
population of Ukraine under the age of 18 and older in all regions, except for the temporarily
occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas. The sample is representative by age, sex, and type
of settlement. Sample population: 1,200 respondents. The survey method is a telephone
interview using a computer. With a 95% confidence level, the study’s representativeness error
is not more than 2.8%. According to the survey, 63% of respondents support the idea of
breaking ties between the UOC-MP and the ROC. Only 10% do not support this proposal,
another 18% said they did not care, and 9% could not answer this question. It is notable that
among the believers of the UOC-MP, more than half also support the severance of ties with the
ROC; a quarter say that they do not care, and only 13% of them are against the division.36
On April 6, 2022, the Rating Sociological Group conducted the Eighth National Survey
“Ukraine in the Conditions of War.” The results of the poll showed that support for the idea of
breaking ties between the UOC-MP and the ROC is growing. If at the beginning of March this
opinion was supported by 63%, then at the beginning of April the number reached 74% and
was completely rejected only by 7%. It is important to note that half of the respondents (51%)
give the state the right to permanently ban the activities of the UOC-MP on the territory of
Ukraine (the ban is supported by two thirds of the respondents from the west and only by 29%
from the east). At the same time, 21% support the deprivation of benefits and the abolition of

Оцінка ситуації в Україні (8 – 9 березня 2022). [Assessment of the situation in Ukraine (March 8-9, 2022)
https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/ocenka_situacii_v_ukraine_8-9_marta_2022.html
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leases of church buildings. On the other hand, 20% are in favor of the non-interference of the
Ukrainian state in the affairs of the church, most of them in the east (35%) and south (25%).37
Thus, in addition to the fanatical supporters of V. Putin and Patriarch Kirill, who are convinced
of the incapacity of the Ukrainian state and that the OCU is from the devil and not from God,
many UOC-MP believers are law-abiding citizens of Ukraine and must be worked with
consistently and purposefully.
In our opinion, such a balanced state policy, aimed primarily at the re-education of proRussian citizens, will eventually contribute to the final unification of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy,
which will become a fait accompli, and the UOC-MP under the name ROC in Ukraine will
take its place in Ukraine’s religious life and will finally disappear like dew in the sun.
Currently, Ukraine and its citizens face two main challenges: the military–how quickly
the Ukrainian Armed Forces will destroy Russian aggressors and liberate the temporarily
occupied territories, and internal–whether Ukrainians will be able to finally dismantle the clanoligarchic system and build a democratic, legal, spiritual, innovative, and prosperous Ukrainian
Independent Unified State. That is why the stated position of the newly created OCU should
promote the spiritual development of the Ukrainian people, the development of the Ukrainian
political nation and Ukrainian civil society, the consolidation of Ukrainians in the undeclared
Russian-Ukrainian hybrid warfare, and the final victory over the enemy.
Conclusions
Thus, having analyzed the development of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the context of
Russia’s revenge policy against Ukraine at the turn of the 21st century, its positive impact on
domestic ethnocultural, statehood, nation-building and challenges facing it at the beginning of
the second millennium, we have come to the following conclusions. First, the Russian state has
existed for three centuries in the format of an empire (feudal-capitalist, totalitarian-Soviet, and
autocratic), and during all this time, Ukraine and Ukrainians have been an important component
of these predatory state entities. Second, almost a quarter of a century of inactivity of the
domestic authorities and active anti-Ukrainian and anti-state actions of the ROC and its LittleRussian branch of the UOC-MP contributed to their introduction into the Ukrainian
humanitarian space of fundamental ideas, dogmas, and postulates of the “Russian World,”

Восьме загальнонаціональне опитування: Україна в умовах війни (6 квітня 2022) [Eighth nationwide
poll: Ukraine during the war (April 6, 2022)]
https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_usloviyah_voyny_6_apre
lya_2022.html
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which subsequently led to the occupation by Russia of Crimea and part of Donbas and the socalled “Russian Spring” in 2014. Third, the armed and information aggression of the Russian
Federation in early 2014 called into question the very existence of Ukrainian statehood and the
Ukrainian nation, but thanks to the all-Ukrainian patriotic movement, including the stated
policy and position of the UOC-KP, the enemy was stopped. Fourth, the undeclared RussianUkrainian hybrid warfare led not only to temporary territorial losses, huge casualties, tragedies,
etc., but also to the unification of Ukrainians, the creation of a Ukrainian political nation, a
significant strengthening of the UOC-KP, and a significant weakening of the UOC-MP. Fifth,
the Russian armed information aggression became a catalyst for the unification of proUkrainian forces and intensified the process of establishing the OCU. Sixth, the unification of
the Ukrainian Orthodoxy will help weaken the ROC’s geopolitical ambitions and end its
dominance in Eastern Christendom and significantly strengthen the position of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate. Seventh, the combination of efforts of the Ukrainian authorities, civil society, and
parishioners is extremely important for the development of the OCU. Eighth, the results of the
study show that, among other types of identities, religious identity is of low importance in the
system of respondents’ identities. Respondents from the eastern region of Ukraine did not
answer positively to the need for an independent Ukrainian church; the majority of respondents
from other regions of Ukraine perceived the autonomy of the OCU positively. Ninth, in the
context of a full-scale invasion of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine,
which began on 24.02.2022, Ukrainians united in the name of victory over the aggressor, so
the UOC-MP patriotic believers will have to make a final choice and join the OCU to not only
weaken the pro-Russian fifth column in Ukraine but help resistance forces in liberation of the
temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory. Tenth, the final victory over the Russian aggressor,
in addition to military, geopolitical, diplomatic, political, economic, ethnocultural factors, will
necessarily require the use of the sacred and spiritual factor–the creation of the OCU,
unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and strengthening of its national and patriotic state activity
in the name of building a democratic, spiritual, legal, innovative, prosperous, and powerful
Ukrainian Independent Unified State.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2022) XLII, 4

43

References
Архієпископ Євстратій (Зоря) Колаборант "русского мира". [Archbishop Eustratius
(Zorya)
Collaborator
of
the
"Russian
world"]
http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/yevstratij/55a8de30a8c6d
Борейко Ю, Православна ідентичність у сучасному українському суспільстві
Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів VІ Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ,
2016), c. 831–837. [Orthodox identity in modern Ukrainian society (Kyiv, 2016), pp. 831–837]
Восьме загальнонаціональне опитування: Україна в умовах війни (6 квітня 2022) [Eighth
nationwide
poll:
Ukraine
during
the
war
(April
6,
2022)]
https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina_v_uslovi
yah_voyny_6_aprelya_2022.html
Єрємєєв, О.С. Проблеми та перспективи становлення Української Помісної
Православної Церкви на сучасному етапі розвитку українського суспільства
Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів V Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ
2015, Ч. 1.), с. 215-225. [Problems and prospects of formation of the Ukrainian Local
Orthodox Church at the present stage of development of Ukrainian society. Orthodoxy in
Ukraine: Proceedings of the V International Scientific Conference (Kyiv, 2015, Part 1.) p. 215225.]
Здіорук, С. Національна Церква та національна релігія як форми духовного
самовираження етносу. Релігія і нація в суспільному житті України й світу. (Київ:
Наукова думка, 2006), с. 73-86. [National Church and national religion as forms of spiritual
self-expression of the ethnos. Religion and nation in the public life of Ukraine and the world
(Kyiv: scientific thought, 2006), pp. 73-86.]
Кагамлик, С. Divide et impera. Російський централізм як конфліктизаційний чинник для
українського православ’я в ретроспективі та сучасних реаліях. Українознавчий
альманах.( К.: «Міленіум», 2019, Випуск 25). С. 77–83. [Divide et impera. Russian
centralism as a factor of conflict for Ukrainian Orthodoxy in retrospect and modern realities.
Ukrainian Studies Almanac. (Kyiv: Millennium, 2019, Issue 25.), pp. 77-83]
Колодний, А., Здіорук, С. Становлення національних церков як складової національного
відродження Релігійна свобода: історичне підґрунтя, правові основи і реалії сьогодення.
(Київ, 1998), с. 43–49. [Formation of national churches as part of the national revival.
Religious freedom: historical background, legal framework and realities of today. (Kyiv, 1998),
pp. 43–49.]
Клос, В. Протоієрей. Автокефалія Української Церкви: огляд від Хрещення до
Синодального Томосу. (Київ, 2019), 190 с. [Archpriest. Autocephaly of the Ukrainian
Church: an overview from Baptism to the Synodal Thomas. (K, 2019), 190 p.]
Крисаченко, В. Світоглядна парадигма ХХ ст.: український внесок. Українознавство.
(2008, № 1), с. 76–82. [Worldview paradigm of the twentieth century: the Ukrainian
contribution. Ukrainian Studies. (2008, № 1), pp. 76–82.]

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2022) XLII, 4

44

Оцінка ситуації в Україні (8 – 9 березня 2022). [Assessment of the situation in Ukraine
(March 8-9, 2022) https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/ocenka_situacii_v_ukraine_89_marta_2022.html
Павленко, П. Ю. Українська Православна Церква Московського Патріархату –
епіцентр російського неоімперіалізму в Україні (погляд через призму війни на Донбасі).
Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів V Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ,
2015, Ч. 1.), с. 162–171. [Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate - the
epicenter of Russian neo-imperialism in Ukraine (view through the prism of the war in
Donbass). Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the V International Scientific Conference.
(Kyiv, 2015, Part 1), pp. 162–171]
Пірен, М. І. Роль духовних цінностей у формуванні громадянської позиції особистості
в сучасному проблемному українському суспільстві. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник
матеріалів V Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2015, Ч. 1), с. 172–180. [The role
of spiritual values in the formation of civic position of the individual in modern problematic
Ukrainian society. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the V International Scientific
Conference (Kyiv, 2015, Part 1), pp. 172– 80]
Потапенко, Я. П’ята російсько-українська війна: від майдану до східного фронту
(підходи, оцінки, інтерпретації). (Переяслав-Хмельницький: Видавництво К С В, 2016),
304 с. [The fifth Russian-Ukrainian war: from the Maidan to the Eastern Front (approaches,
assessments, interpretations). (Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky: KS Publishing House, 2016), 304 p]
Преловська, І. Помісний Собор Української Православної Церкви 1-3 листопада 1991
року: передумови і наслідки. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів VІ Міжнародної
наукової конференції. (Київ, 2016), с. 429–439. [Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church November 1-3, 1991: preconditions and consequences. Orthodoxy in Ukraine:
Proceedings of the VI International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2016), pp. 429–439.]
Промова Блаженнішого Митрополита Київського і Всієї України Епіфанія на церемонії
вручення шанованої нагороди Athenagoras Human Right Award. Православ’я в Україні:
Збірник матеріалів ІХ Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2019), с.9–13. . [Speech
of His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine Epiphany at the Athenagoras Human
Right Award ceremony. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the IX International Scientific
Conference. (Kyiv, 2019), pp.9–13]
Релігійна самоідентифікація населення і ставлення до основних церков України: червень
2021 року. [Religious self-identification of the population and attitude to the main churches of
Ukraine: June 2021] http://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1052.
Саган, О.Н. Національні прояви православ’я: український аспект. (Київ: Світ Знань,
2001), 256 с. [National manifestations of Orthodoxy: the Ukrainian aspect. (Kyiv: World of
Knowledge, 2001), 256 p.];
Саган, О. Н. Суспільний запит на Помісну Церкву: проблеми, перспективи реалізації.
Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів V Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ,
2015, Ч. 1), с. 181–189. [Public demand for the Local Church: problems, prospects for
implementation. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the V International Scientific
Conference. (Kyiv, 2015, Part 1), pp. 181-189]

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2022) XLII, 4

45

Семенова, О., Герасько М. Національно-культурна ідентичність українського
суспільства у контексті сучасних гуманітарних викликів. Українознавство. (2020, № 2),
с. 130 – 145. [ National and cultural identity of Ukrainian society in the context of modern
humanitarian challenges. Ukrainian Studies. (2020, № 2), pp. 130– 45]
Фігурний, Ю. «Русский мир» – важливий чинник агресії Російської Федерації супроти
України й українців. Українознавство. (2016, № 3 (60)), с. 40–59. ["Russian World" is an
important factor in the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Ukrainians.
Ukrainian Studies. (2016, № 3 (60)), pp. 40–59.]
Фігурний, Ю. Розвиток Українського Православ’я на зламі тисячоліть: етнокультурні,
державотворчі та націєтворчі аспекти. Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ
Міжнародної наукової конференції. (Київ, 2019). с. 564–573. [Development of Ukrainian
Orthodoxy at the turn of the millennium: ethnocultural, state-building and nation-building
aspects. Orthodoxy in Ukraine: Proceedings of the IX International Scientific Conference.
(Kyiv, 2019), pp. 564–573]
Чирков, О. Зміни релігійної ситуації у світлі тенденцій етнокультурного розвитку
України (1985-2019). Православ’я в Україні: Збірник матеріалів ІХ Міжнародної
наукової конференції.– К., 2019. – С. 574–583. [Changes in the religious situation in the
light of trends in ethnocultural development of Ukraine (1985-2019). Orthodoxy in Ukraine:
Proceedings of the IX International Scientific Conference. (Kyiv, 2019), pp. 574–583]
Шуба, О. В. Релігія в етнонаціональному розвитку України (політологічний аналіз).
(Київ,1999), 222 с. [Religion in the ethno-national development of Ukraine (political science
analysis) (Kyiv, 1999), 222 p]
Яблонський, В. М.; Здіорук, С. І.; Токман, В. В; Астаф’єф, В. В.; Валевський, О. Л.;
Зубченко С. О.; Іщенко, А. Ю.; Литвиненко, О. М. Україна та проект «Русского Мира».
Аналітична доповідь. (Київ, 2014), 95 с. [Ukraine and the project "Russian World".
Analytical report. (Kyiv, 2014), 95 p]

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2022) XLII, 4

46

